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Abstract. This paper studies qualitative properties of an optimal contract in a multi-agent setting
in which agents are subject to a common shock. We derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the optimal reward of an agent producing an output level y to be a decreasing (increasing)
function of the outputs of the other agents, under the assumption that the agents’ outputs are
informative signals of the value of the common shock. The condition is that the likelihood ratio
p(y,e,η)/p(y,e0,η), where e is a higher eﬀort level than e0, and η is the value of the common shock,
be a decreasing (increasing) function of η. We derive conditions on the way the common shock
aﬀects the marginal product of eﬀort under which the likelihood ratio is decreasing for all output
levels, or increasing for some output levels and decreasing for others.Common Shocks and Relative Compensation Schemes
1. Introduction
It has been shown by Holsmtr¨ om (1982) and Mookherjee (1984) that when a common shock aﬀects
the performance of several agents, the optimal contract of one agent depends on the performance
of the others. Holsmtr¨ om also showed that under speciﬁc assumptions on the production function
and under normality assumptions on the distribution of the shocks, the information provided by
the performance of the other agents can be summarized in an average which is a suﬃcient statistic
for the common shock. However little has been established on the way an optimal contract makes
use of the information provided by the realized performance of the other agents. Should the reward
of an agent decrease or increase when the performance of agents in the comparison group increases?
We derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the optimal reward of an agent producing an
output level y to be a decreasing (increasing) function of the outputs of the other agents, under
the assumption that the agents’ outputs are informative signals of the value of the common shock.
The condition is that the likelihood ratio p(y,e,η)/p(y,e0,η), where e is a higher eﬀort level than
e0, and η is the value of the common shock, be a decreasing (increasing) function of η.I f y is a
high outcome, a decreasing likelihood ratio formalizes the idea that the more favorable the common
shock, the less likely it is that the observed output y is attributable to high rather than low eﬀort,
while if y is a low outcome, the more likely it is that y is to be attributed to low eﬀort. According
to the principle that an incentive contract should reward an agent in circumstances which are likely
to occur when eﬀort is high, and punish the agent in circumstances which are likely to occur when
eﬀort is low, the compensation decreases when the performance of other agents increases. When
the likelihood ratio is increasing rather than decreasing in η, the reward of an agent increases with
the performance of the other agents.
We derive conditions under which the likelihood ratio is decreasing for all output levels, or
increasing for some output levels and decreasing for others. The conditions hinge on the way the
common shock aﬀects the marginal product of eﬀort. If the shock enters additively and does not
aﬀect the marginal product of eﬀort, as in the model of Green-Stokey (1983), then the optimal
contract is ‘tournament-like’ in that the payoﬀ of an agent always decreases when the performance
of other agents increases. When the common shock positively aﬀects the productivity of eﬀort, as in
1the model of Nalebuﬀ-Stiglitz (1983), a higher shock tends to raise the productivity of eﬀort. Then
suﬃciently high outcomes are more likely to come from high eﬀort, while low outcomes are always
more likely to come from low eﬀort: thus for low outcomes the reward is a decreasing function of
the performance of others, while for suﬃciently high outcomes it is increasing. When the shock
adversely aﬀects the productivity of eﬀort, the eﬀects are reversed. In the conclusion, we discuss
the application of these results to executive compensation.
2. Model
Consider a collection of K ﬁrms which produce a homogenous output (proﬁt) and a collection of
K managers who run these ﬁrms. Managers are assumed to be matched to ﬁrms: manager k can
only manage ﬁrm k or take an outside option which determines his reservation utility of working
for ﬁrm k. The output yk of ﬁrm k depends on the entrepreneurial eﬀort ek of its manager, on
a random shock η ∈<which is common to all ﬁrms and on an idiosyncratic shock ￿k. Thus
yk = hk(ek,η,￿ k), where ek ∈< +, k ∈ K.1 We assume that hk can only take a countable number
of values2 indexed in increasing order by sk ∈ Sk = {1,···,S k}: that is sk >s 0
k =⇒ ysk >y s0
k.
The idiosyncratic and common shocks {￿1,···,￿ K,η} are assumed to be unobservable indepen-
dent random variables. For given ek and η, the distribution function of ￿k induces a probability




sk≤α}pk(sk,e k,η). For all k ∈ K the probabilities (pk)k∈K are assumed to
have the following properties:
(A1) pk(sk,e k,η) > 0 for all (sk,e k,η) ∈ Sk ×< + ×<and pk is a diﬀerentiable function of ek.




is an increasing function of sk.
(A3) For all η ∈< , and minsk(yk
sk) ≤ α<maxsk(yk




is a concave increasing function of ek.
(A4) For any ek ∈< +, pk(sk,e k,η) is log-supermodular in (sk,η), i.e. if η>η 0 the ratio
pk(sk,e k,η)/pk(sk,e k,η0) is increasing in sk.
1We use the same notation for a set and for the number of its elements.
2The proof of the theorem carries over without change to the case of continuous outcomes provided that we can use
the “ﬁrst-order approach”. As Jewitt pointed out, Assumption A3 may not be satisﬁed in a model with continuous
outcomes and standard assumptions on the shocks, in which case it may be replaced by the assumptions suggested
by Jewitt (1988). To simplify the exposition we present the model and the assumptions needed for the ﬁrst-order
approach to be valid only in the countable case (see Rogerson (1985)).
2Thus for a given value of the common shock η, pk(sk,e k,η) satisﬁes the standard assumptions:





k,η) is increasing in sk (Milgrom (1981)), i.e pk is log-supermodular in
(sk,e k). This implies that a larger eﬀort leads to a stochastically dominant shift in Fk, but (A3)
adds the condition of stochastic decreasing returns to eﬀort. (A4) is the condition needed to
ensure that a high realization of ﬁrm k can be interpreted as a signal that the common shock η
has been favorable: for the same level of eﬀort, a higher value of η implies a greater likelihood
of high outcomes, or, since the property of log-supermodularity is symmetric, observing a higher
production for a ﬁrm increases the likelihood that the shock η has been favorable. A4 implies that
if η>η 0 the distribution function Fk(α,ek,η) stochastically dominates Fk(α,ek,η0) (see Rogerson
(1985)), and, since this is true for all ﬁrms, high values of η constitute a positive shock, while low
values of η are negative shocks for the economy.
Let S = S1 × ...× SK. A state of the economy is a realization s =( s1,...,s K) ∈ S,
namely a vector of realized outputs ys =( y1
s1,...,yK
sK) for the K ﬁrms. When we consider the
optimal contract for manager k it will be convenient to use the notation s =( sk,s−k), where
s−k =( s1,...,s k−1,s k+1,...,s K), and similarly e =( ek,e−k) for the vector of eﬀort levels of the
managers. Since the idiosyncratic shocks are independent, for a given vector e and a given value





Let G(η)be the distributionfunction of η. When the realizationof η is not known the probability





since η isindependent of the idiosyncraticshocks. We assume thatthe randomvariables {￿1,···,￿ K,η}
are not observable by any agent but that the structure of the economy (p1,...,p K,G) is common
knowledge.
Each ﬁrm k is owned by a collection of risk-neutral shareholders, who hire the manager and oﬀer
an incentive contract τk which guarantees the manager’s reservation utility level. Each manager is
risk averse and, given the pay schedule τk and eﬀort ek has utility
Uk(τk,e k)=E(uk(τk))− ck(ek)
where uk(·),c k(·) are diﬀerentiable, increasing, uk(·) is concave and ck(·) is convex. Let ¯ νk denote
the manager’s reservation utility.
3Because the realization s−k of ﬁrms other than k contains information about the common shock
η, the optimal contract τk for manager k will use this information to provide incentives at least
cost for the shareholders. The contract τk will thus depend on the realized state s =( sk,s−k) and
since the probability of the realization s−k depends on the eﬀort levels e−k of the other agents, the
optimal eﬀort of manager k will indirectly depend on the eﬀort levels of the other managers. We
will restrict attention to interior Nash equilibria where all managers are induced to make a positive
eﬀort.
Deﬁnition. (¯ τ,¯ e)=( ¯ τ1,...,¯ τK,¯ e1,...,¯ eK) with ¯ e ￿ 0 is an interior Nash equilibrium with















P(s,e k,¯ e−k)uk(τk(s)) − c0
k(ek)=0 ( I C k)
Remark. It is easy to verify that under A1-A3, concavity of uk and convexity of ck, the ﬁrst-order
condition (ICk) characterizes the optimal eﬀort ¯ ek > 0 of manager k (even though the contract
depends on s−k), and that the associated multiplier is positive.
3. Result
The properties of the optimal contract ¯ τk at a Nash equilibrium (¯ τ,¯ e) can be derived from the
ﬁrst-order conditions for the maximum problem (Pk) with respect to τk =( τk









k(¯ τk(s)), s ∈ S (Fτ)
where (λk,µ k) ￿ 0 are the multipliers associated with the participation and incentive constraints





Proposition. Let (A1)-(A4) be satisﬁed. For any realizationsk ∈ Sk, the optimalreward schedule
¯ τk(sk,s−k) in a Nash equilibrium is a decreasing (increasing) function of s−k for all distribution
4functions G(η) if and only if the local likelihood function Lk(sk,¯ ek,η) is a decreasing (increasing)
function of η.3
Proof: (⇐) Suppose Lk(sk,¯ ek,η) is decreasing in η. We want to show that if s,s0 ∈ S are such
that sk = s0
k and sj ≥ s0
j for all j 6= k with at least one strict inequality, then ¯ τk(s) < ¯ τk(s0). Since
µk > 0 and u0
k is strictly decreasing it follows from (Fτ) that what we need to show is that A<0,




























Note that for all s ∈ S, a(s,¯ e,η) > 0,
R











By (A4), since log-supermodularity is symmetric in (sk,η), if sj >s 0
j, the ratio pj(sj,¯ ej,η)/
pj(s0
j,¯ ej,η) is an increasing function of η. Since sj >s 0
j for at least one ﬁrm, it follows that






< a(s0,¯ e,η)dG(η)=1 ,λ(η) cannot be always strictly larger or strictly
smaller than 1. Thus there exists ¯ η ∈<such that λ(η) ≤ 1i fη ≤ ¯ η and λ(η) > 1i fη>¯ η, and
R
η≤¯ η dG(η) > 0,
R













a(s,¯ e,η)− a(s0,¯ e,η)
￿
dG(η)
If η ≤ ¯ η then a(s,¯ e,η)−a(s0,¯ e,η) ≤ 0 and since the likelihood function is a decreasing function of
η, Lk(sk,¯ ek,η) ≥ Lk(sk,¯ ek, ¯ η) so that
Lk(sk,¯ ek,η)
￿
a(s,¯ e,η)− a(s0,¯ e,η)
￿
≤ Lk(sk,¯ ek, ¯ η)
￿
a(s,¯ e,η)− a(s0,¯ e,η)
￿
(2)
3i.e. if pk(sk,¯ ek,η) is log-submodular (log-supermodular) in (ek,η).
4For sake of completeness and to tie this part of the proof with the “only if” part, we give the direct proof without
using the fact that a is supermodular in (s,η) and that this in turn implies a property of ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance.
5If η>¯ η, then a(s,¯ e,η)−a(s0,¯ e,η) > 0 and Lk(sk,¯ ek,η) <L k(sk,¯ ek, ¯ η) so that (2) is satisﬁed with
a strict inequality. Thus




a(s,¯ e,η)− a(s0,¯ e,η)
￿
dG(η)=0
If the function Lk(sk,¯ ek,·) is increasing in η then inequality (2) is reversed and A>0, so that the
optimal wage schedule is increasing in s−k.
(⇒) Suppose Lk(sk,¯ ek,·) is not decreasing. Then there exist η>η 0 such that Lk(sk,¯ ek,η) ≥
Lk(sk,¯ ek,η0). Consider a distribution function G which puts weight only on η and η0. Since




< a(s0,¯ e,η)dG(η) = 1, it must be
that a(s,¯ e,η0) − a(s0,¯ e,η0) < 0 and a(s,¯ e,η)− a(s0,¯ e,η) > 0. Thus A deﬁned in (1) is such that
A ≥ Lk(sk,¯ ek,η0)
￿
a(s,¯ e,η0) − a(s0,¯ e,η0))G(η0)+( a(s,¯ e,η)− a(s0,¯ e,η))(1− G(η0))
￿
=0
and, for the distribution function G, the payoﬀ is non-decreasing in s−k. Thus the payoﬀ is
decreasing in s−k for all distribution G only if the local likelihood function Lk is decreasing in η.
2
Remark. To create incentives at minimum cost, the optimal contract ¯ τk must reward the manager
in circumstances which are most likely to occur when the agent makes a high rather than a low
eﬀort and punish the agent in circumstances which are more likely with a low eﬀort. If ek is a high
eﬀort level and e0











If the local likelihood Lk at sk decreases when η increases, then the relative likelihood that sk is
observed with ek rather than e0
k decreases (or the relative likelihood that sk is observed with e0
k
rather than ek increases). If the shareholders could observe the common shock and base the contract
on η, the reward of the manager would decrease when η increases. When η is not observable, the
realizations s−k of the ﬁrms other than k give information on the value of η: since by A4 the
likelihood of high outcomes increase with η, higher values for s−k lead to a higher estimate of η
and a lower reward for manager k.
64. Examples
We give two examples of settings where the Proposition can be used to analyze properties of the
optimal reward schedule.
Example 1. Consider the simple symmetric setting where the characteristics of all ﬁrms and
managers are the same and each ﬁrm has only two outcomes (Sk =2 ,k ∈ K), a good outcome
yg and a bad outcome yb, with 0 <y b <y g. The optimal reward schedule for manager k is of
the form τk(sk,s−k)=τk(sk,n(s−k)) where n(s−k) denotes the number of good outcomes for the
K − 1 other ﬁrms: in view of the symmetry, the number n = n(s−k) is all that is needed to
characterize the realizations s−k of the other ﬁrms. To simplify notation let ρ(e,η) denote the
probability of a good outcome for a ﬁrm when its manager’s eﬀort is e and the aggregate shock
is η, i.e. pk(g,ek,η)=ρ(ek,η) and pk(b,ek,η)=1− ρ(ek,η), k ∈ K. Using subscripts for partial
derivatives, A1-A4 are satisﬁed if ρe > 0,ρ η > 0,ρ ee ≤ 0. Since the derivatives of the likelihood




−ρeη(1 − ρ) − ρeρη
(1 − ρ)2
the characteristics of the reward schedule τk(sk,n(s−k)) depend on the sign of the cross partial
derivative ρeη.
(a) ρeη =0
The likelihood function L is decreasing in η for both outcomes and the optimal reward schedule
satisﬁes ¯ τk(b,n) < ¯ τk(g,n) (because of A2) and ¯ τk(sk,n) < ¯ τk(sk,n 0)i fn>n 0. The reward
schedule is “tournament-like” in that the more other agents there are who have a good outcome,
the less manager k is paid.
(b) ρeη 6=0
(i) ρeη > 0. The likelihood function is decreasing in η for the low outcome, Lη(b,e,η) < 0, but
for the high outcome the sign is ambiguous. If ρ is given by ρ(e,η)=a + be αηβ with a>0,b>
0,a + b<1, 0 <α<1,β>0 then Lη(g,e,η) > 0. In this case the reward ¯ τk(b,n) decreases
when n increases, while ¯ τk(g,n) is an increasing function of n. When few other ﬁrms have good
outcomes, η is likely to be low and eﬀort is not likely to have much eﬀect, so that a good or bad
outcome for ﬁrm k has to be attributed to chance. When more ﬁrms have good outcomes, signaling
7a higher η, the managers’s eﬀort is more likely to have an eﬀect so that it is worthwhile to reward
when the outcome is good and punish when it is bad.
(ii) ρeη < 0.Lis decreasing in η for the good outcome and has an ambiguous sign for the bad
outcome. If ρ is given by ρ(e,η)=a + b(e + η)α with 0 ≤ e ≤ 1/2, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1/2,a>0,b>
0,a + b ≤ 1, 0 <α<1 and (1 − α)/α > b/(1 − a), then Lη(b,e,η) > 0. In this case ¯ τk(g,n)
decreases when n increases, while ¯ τk(b,n) is an increasing function of n. Because of the decreasing
returns property in e + η, a high value of η implies that the marginal eﬀect of eﬀort is low. Thus
observing a high number of good outcomes for the other ﬁrms makes it unlikely that either a good
or a bad outcome is the result of eﬀort. As n decreases, the reward for a good outcome, and the
punishment for a bad outcome, increase. Thus, while in case (i) the biggest diﬀerential between a
good and a bad outcome for manager k occurs when many ﬁrms have good outcomes, in case (ii)
it occurs when few ﬁrms have good outcomes.
For simplicity of exposition we have focused on the case where the outcome is a discrete random
variable but it is clear that the proposition applies to models in which the outcome is a continuous
random variable (with density replacing probability mass), provided A4 is satisﬁed and the optimal
contract satisﬁes the FOCs (Fτ) with µk > 0.
Example 2. In standard continuous outcomes models with a common shock, η enters either
additively as in the model of Lazear-Rosen (1981) and Green-Stokey (1983) with hk(ek,￿ k,η)=
z(ek,￿ k)+η, or multiplicatively as in the model of Nalebuﬀ-Stiglitz (1983) with hk(ek,￿ k,η)=
ekη + ￿k. In all cases (￿1,...,￿ K) are i.i.d. and independent of η.
Let us show that the optimal reward schedule is tournament-like in the additive case while the
reward can be either increasing or decreasing in the performance of others when the common shock
aﬀects the marginal product of eﬀort.
(a) η does not aﬀect the marginal product of eﬀort.
Let h(e,η,￿)=z(e,￿)+η be the production function common to all ﬁrms where the distribution
of z given e has a density f(z,e) which is log-concave and satisﬁes MLRC, i.e.
fz(z,e)
f(z,e)
is decreasing in z,
fe(z,e)
f(z,e)
is increasing in z
f is assumed to be log-concave to ensure that A4 holds: this is not a demanding assumption since
most standard distributions (normal, gamma, chi square, Poisson, exponential, and more) are log-
concave. The density function of the output y given the manager’s eﬀort e and the aggregate shock
8η is given by e f(y,e,η)=f(y−η,e), with the local likelihood function L(y,e,η)=fe(y−η,e)/f(y−
η,e). If f satisﬁes MLRC, then L is a decreasing function of η: for a given realization of a ﬁrm,
if η is higher, z is lower and, since MLRC holds, this tends to signal less eﬀort on the part of the
manager. Since A4 is satisﬁed, for any realization yk, the pay of manager k is a decreasing function
of the outcomes of the other agents.
(b) η aﬀects the marginal product of eﬀort.
Consider a more general version of the model of Nalebuﬀ-Stiglitz where all ﬁrms have the
production function h(e,η,￿)=φ(e,η)+￿, with φ>0,φ e > 0,φ η > 0 where φ describes the
production due to eﬀort and the aggregate shock η, and the idiosyncratic shock ￿ is additive. To
ensure that A4 holds we assume that the density of the idiosyncratic shock f(￿) is log-concave.
The density function for the outcome y given e and η is e f(y,e,η)=f(y−φ(e,η)) and the function
L is given by L(y,e,η)=−φe(e,η)f0(y − φ(e,η))/f(y− φ(e,η)). It is diﬃcult to sign Lη without
making more speciﬁc assumptions on the form of the density function f. The standard assumption
is that the idiosyncratic shock is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. Then
L(y,e,η)=( 1 /σ2)φe(e,η)(y − φ(e,η)) and
Lη(y,e,η)=
1
σ2 (φeηy − (φeηφ + φeφη))
(i) φeη > 0. An increase in η increases the marginal product of eﬀort. If y<0 then Lη(y,e,η) <
0: when a low outcome is observed for ﬁrm k, the higher the realizations of other ﬁrms, the more
likely it is that η was high and that eﬀort was productive, and the more likely that the bad outcome
can be attributed to shirking. When y is positiveLη(y,e,η)may not have the same sign for all values
of η, but the sign is positive for suﬃciently high outcomes, provided φ is bounded. For example if
φ(e,η)=eαηβ, with 0 <α<1,β>0,e ∈ [0,e max],η∈ [0,ηmax], then φeηφ + φeφη =2 φφeη and
Lη(y,e,η)=( 1 /σ2)φeη(y − 2φ) > 0i fy>2φ(emax,ηmax). This case is the analogue for the model
with continuous outcomes of case b(i) in Example 1.
(ii) φeη < 0. To sign φeηφ + φeφη, let us assume that φ(e,η)=( e + η)α, with 0 <α<1. If
0 <α<1/2,φ eηφ + φeφη < 0, so that if y<0, then Lη(y,e,η) > 0. In this case the decreasing
returns are very strong: a higher value of η decreases the productivity of eﬀort so that a bad
outcome is less likely to be due to lack of eﬀort and the punishment decreases. For y>0 the sign
of Lη may not be constant but it is negative for high values of y (y>1−2α
1−α φ(emax,ηmax)) if φ is
bounded. If α =1 /2, φeηφ + φeφη = 0, so that Lη > 0 for y<0 and Lη < 0 for y>0. If α>1/2,
φeηφ + φeφη > 0 so that when y>0, Lη < 0. For y<0 the sign may not be constant but is
9positive for low values of y provided φ is bounded. The case φeη < 0 is thus the analogue of case
b(ii) in Example 1.
5. Conclusion
The discussion of relative performance compensation of CEOs in corporate ﬁnance generally
uses the simplest additive model (hk(ek,￿ k,η)=ek + ￿k + η)) as the reference model (see e.g.
Gibbons-Murphy (1990)). It is argued that relative performance evaluation is valuable because it
factors out the eﬀect of agggregate shocks and eliminates unnecessary risks from the compensation:
relative performance evaluation implies that a CEO’s compensation should be a decreasing function
of the outcomes of other ﬁrms. Murphy’s survey (1999) however reports that only 20% of large
US companies explicitly use relative performance criteria to determine CEO compensation. On the
other hand the same survey shows that the majority of large corporations use stock options and
that in the last ten years they have become the most signiﬁcant component of CEO compensation.
Although stock options could be indexed on the market—to make them adhere to the relative
performance criterion—in practice they are not. As a result, the compensation of a CEO is higher
when the overall level of economic activity and the stock market are higher.
From the above analysis this type of compensation may be justiﬁed if the general state of the
economy positively aﬀects the productivity of the top executive. And it seems plausible, when
entrepreuneurship and innovation are the qualities required, that the actions of a CEO will have
their greatest impact in good times, when the economy is expanding and has the greatest capacity to
absorb new products or new technologies. However if the principal part of the CEO’s contribution
is to steer the ﬁrm through diﬃcult times, then the compensation should be higher when the ﬁrm
does well while the market as a whole is depressed, and in this case stock options are not an
appropriate type of compensation. Thus it seems that a model like that in Example 2(b), which
obliges us to specify how the economic environment aﬀects the productivity of managerial input,
may be useful for assessing whether CEO compensation should, or should not, factor out industry
and economic trends.
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